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ABSTRACT 
 
Reliability Engineering Approach to Probabilistic Proliferation Resistance Analysis of 
the Example Sodium Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility. (August 2011) 
Lillian Marie Cronholm, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. John Poston 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are one method of proliferation 
resistance which is applied at most nuclear facilities worldwide.  IAEA safeguards act to 
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from a facility through the deterrence of 
detection.  However, even with IAEA safeguards present at a facility, the country where 
the facility is located may still attempt to proliferate nuclear material by exploiting 
weaknesses in the safeguards system.  The IAEA’s mission is to detect the diversion of 
nuclear materials as soon as possible and ideally before it can be weaponized.  Modern 
IAEA safeguards utilize unattended monitoring systems (UMS) to perform nuclear 
material accountancy and maintain the continuity of knowledge with regards to the 
position of nuclear material at a facility.  This research focuses on evaluating the 
reliability of unattended monitoring systems and integrating the probabilistic failure of 
these systems into the comprehensive probabilistic proliferation resistance model of a 
facility. 
 
To accomplish this, this research applies reliability engineering analysis methods to 
probabilistic proliferation resistance modeling.  This approach is demonstrated through 
the analysis of a safeguards design for the Example Sodium Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle 
Facility (ESFR FCF). 
 
 iv
The ESFR FCF UMS were analyzed to demonstrate the analysis and design processes 
that an analyst or designer would go through when evaluating/designing the proliferation 
resistance component of a safeguards system.  When comparing the mean time to failure 
(MTTF) for the system without redundancies versus one with redundancies, it is 
apparent that redundancies are necessary to achieve a design without routine failures. 
 
A reliability engineering approach to probabilistic safeguards system analysis and design 
can be used to reach meaningful conclusions regarding the proliferation resistance of a 
UMS.  The methods developed in this research provide analysts and designers alike a 
process to follow to evaluate the reliability of a UMS. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
AD   Assembly Disassembly 
AF   Assembly Fabrication 
AFCI   Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative 
AMS   Attended Monitoring System 
BU   Burnup 
CDF   Cumulative Distribution Function 
Cm-Pu   Curium-Plutonium 
CoK   Continuity of Knowledge 
C/S   Containment and Surveillance 
CW   Ceramic Waste Processing 
DAQ   Data Acquisition 
DIV   Design Information Verification 
EC   Element Chopper 
ER     Electro-Refiner 
ESFR     Example Sodium Fast Reactor 
FCF   Fuel Cycle Facility 
FP   Fission Product 
GenIV   Generation IV 
He3   
3
He or Helium-3 
HEU   Highly Enriched Uranium 
HM   Heavy Metal 
IAEA    International Atomic Energy Agency 
IC   Product Prep Injection Caster Furnace 
IS&NP  International Safeguards and Nonproliferation 
KMP   Key Measurement Point 
MBA   Material Balance Area 
MCNP   Monte Carlo n-Particle 
 viii 
MTBF    Mean Time between Failures 
MTTD   Mean Time to Detection 
MTTF    Mean Time to Failure (1/λ) 
MTTR   Mean Time to Repair 
MW   Metal Waste Processing 
NMA   Nuclear Material Accountancy 
NPT   Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
OP   Oxidant Production 
PBMR   Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 
PDF   Probability Distribution Function 
PIV   Physical Inventory Verification 
PP   Pin Fabrication/Pin Processing 
PR    Proliferation Resistance 
PR&PP  Proliferation Resistance & Physical Protection 
PUREX  Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction 
PWR   Pressurized Water Reactor 
RM   Remote Monitor 
RMS   Remote Monitoring System 
SQ    Significant Quantity 
TP     U/TRU Product Processing 
TR   U/TRU Extraction/Recovery 
TRU     Transuranic 
UMS   Unattended Monitoring System 
UP     Uranium Product Processing 
WS   Waste Form Temporary Storage 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Probabilistic analysis of the proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems and 
facilities is an active area of research in the field of international safeguards and non-
proliferation.  Methodologies and tools that support both the qualitative and/or 
quantitative analysis are continually being developed and improved.  At present, no 
single approach, model, or method has emerged as a standard for either general or 
specific systems or facilities. 
  
Previous studies on the topic of probabilistic approaches to proliferation resistance focus 
on the identification, analysis, and mitigation of proliferation pathways by the 
assignment of probabilities to each proliferation pathway.  This research develops a 
method to model the proliferation pathway segment associated with the hardware failure 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) unattended monitoring systems 
(UMS).  This method applies probabilistic reliability engineering modeling to IAEA 
UMS installed at a facility and relates the probability of individual component failures to 
the probability of a system failure.  A UMS failure would represent an opportunity for 
proliferation. 
 
In general, probabilistic approaches to analyze diversion or misuse pathways are very 
difficult to analyze because they rely on the assignment of probabilities to the series of 
events that must happen to divert material from a nuclear facility or misuse of a nuclear 
facility.  With no past data on successful covert or clandestine attempts at nuclear 
material diversion (because we would not know of the attempt if it was successful) and 
very little data on unsuccessful attempts, the probabilities would have to be estimated  
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Health Physics. 
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based on best available information and/or expert judgment.  The objective of this 
research is to offer a reliability engineering approach for incorporation into overall 
probabilistic proliferation resistance modeling.  Reliability engineering is the area of 
study concerned with a system or component to perform satisfactorily over a given 
period of time. 
 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards is one method of proliferation 
resistance, which is applied at most nuclear facilities worldwide.  IAEA safeguards act to 
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials from a facility through the deterrence of 
detection.  However, even with IAEA Safeguards present at a facility, the country where 
the facility is located may still attempt to proliferate nuclear material by exploiting 
weaknesses in the safeguards system.  The IAEA’s mission is to detect the diversion of 
nuclear materials as soon as possible and ideally before it can be weaponized.  Modern 
IAEA safeguards utilize unattended monitoring systems (UMS) to perform nuclear 
material accountancy and maintain the continuity of knowledge with regards to the 
position of nuclear material at a facility.  This research focuses on evaluating the 
reliability of unattended monitoring systems and integrating the probabilistic failure of 
these systems into the comprehensive probabilistic proliferation resistance model of a 
facility. 
 
To accomplish this, the research applies reliability engineering analysis methods to 
probabilistic proliferation resistance modeling.  This approach is demonstrated through 
the analysis of a safeguards design for the Example Sodium Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle 
Facility (ESFR FCF).  The analysis demonstrates the probability of safeguards system 
failure which would result in the loss of the continuity of knowledge of nuclear material 
at this facility.  This failure probability of the UMS is then integrated into an overall 
proliferation resistance model of the facility.  A detailed proliferation resistance model 
of the ESFR FCF is outside the scope of this research. 
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A UMS design for the ESFR FCF is presented in this research to facilitate demonstration 
of the reliability analysis process; the design itself is not emphasized.  This UMS design 
for the ESFR FCF is in contrast to other designs which are proposed in the literature.  
Many of the safeguard designs proposed assume infinite financial resources, manpower, 
legal authorities, and futuristic technologies not currently available or in use by the 
IAEA.  This research presents a UMS design for the ESFR FCF using currently available 
technology and a reasonable number of systems to safeguard the facility. 
1.1 SCOPE OF WORK 
This research applies quality engineering concepts to safeguards system analysis and 
design.  A process is developed to calculate the probability of safeguards system failure 
from a probabilistic model of a network of unattended monitoring systems.  This process 
is then applied to the design of a safeguards system for the ESFR FCF. 
 
In Chapter II, the reader is introduced to IAEA Safeguards with an emphasis on the role 
of Unattended Monitoring Systems and the ESFR facility. In Chapter III, a general 
process for the analysis and/or design of the reliability of a safeguards system is 
developed.  In Chapter IV, this process is applied to the ESFR FCF.  In Chapter V, the 
reliability process how it relates to proliferation resistance analysis is discussed. 
 
The beneficiaries of this research are the IAEA, international safeguards and non-
proliferation (IS&NP) community and the proliferation resistance and physical 
protection (PR&PP) community.  This research demonstrates a process that the IAEA 
and the IS&NP community can use to analyze existing safeguards systems and design 
future safeguards systems.  Researchers in the area of PR&PP will be able to utilize the 
probabilistic modeling developed and apply it in a broader sense to more facilities and 
integrate it into broader probabilistic proliferation resistance methods and models. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter discusses modern approaches to IS&NP with references to governing 
documents and IAEA safeguards.  This is followed by a literature review which includes 
previous work in proliferation resistance approaches.  Finally, the IS&NP and PR&PP 
literature specific to the ESFR is discussed. 
2.1 IAEA INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the intergovernmental body which 
administers international safeguards in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).  The IAEA is an independent United Nations (UN) Organization; it draws 
independent conclusions and reports these conclusions to the UN Security Council.  
Every country in the world with the exception of Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea 
participates in the NPT. 
2.1.1 OBJECTIVES 
The objective of IAEA Safeguards is defined to be, “the timely detection of diversion of 
significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes 
unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.” (International 
Atomic Energy Agency 1972)  
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The timeliness criteria is defined to be, “where there is no additional protocol in force or 
where the IAEA has not drawn and maintained a conclusion of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State, the timeliness detection goals are as 
follows: 
 
• One month for unirradiated direct use material, 
• Three months for irradiated direct use material, 
• One year for indirect use material. 
 
Longer timeliness detection goals may be applied in a State where the IAEA has drawn 
and maintained a conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities 
in that State” (International Atomic Energy Agency 2001). 
 
A significant quantity is defined to be, “the approximate amount of nuclear material for 
which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded. 
Significant quantities take into account unavoidable losses due to conversion and 
manufacturing processes and should not be confused with critical masses. Significant 
quantities are used in establishing the quantity component of the IAEA inspection goal” 
(International Atomic Energy Agency 2001).  Significant quantity values currently in 
use are given in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Significant quantities 
Material Significant Quantity (SQ) 
Direct use nuclear material  
     Pu
a
 8 kg 
     
233
U 8 kg 
     HEU (
235
U ≥ 20%) 25 kg 
Indirect use nuclear material  
     U (
235
U < 20%)
b
 75 kg 
235
U 
(or 10 ton natural U 
or 20 ton depleted U) 
     Th 20 tons  
a
 For Pu containing less than 80% 
238
Pu. 
b
 Including low enriched, natural and depleted uranium. 
 
2.1.2 APPROACHES 
As part of the treaty verification regime, the IAEA must determine that the facility has 
not been altered for the purpose of misuse and nuclear material has not been diverted.  
The design information verification (DIV) is performed for each facility as necessary to 
verify that the facility design has not been altered such to perform undeclared activities.  
A physical inventory verification (PIV) is performed as necessary to verify the presence 
of declared materials and the absence of undeclared materials. 
 
One safeguards method to verifying the presence of material is through “nuclear material 
accountancy” (NMA).  This method establishes “Material Balance Areas” (MBAs) 
through which nuclear material flows.  General mass balance equations are applied to 
the special nuclear materials which flow in and out of a MBA as well as materials which 
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are created or destroyed.  In general, MBAs are selected based on the design 
characteristics of the facility and the points in the process area which permit the optimal 
balance between the maximization of materials verification (i.e., minimization of 
measurement uncertainties) and the minimization of inspection resource requirements.   
The locations that the nuclear material is in a form that can be measured for material 
flow or inventory are called key measurement points (KMP).   KMPs are, but not limited 
to, the inputs and outputs of MBAs (International Atomic Energy Agency 2001). Other 
methods of NMA include item counting and item balances for situations which are not 
suitable for mass balances.  For some facilities, significant amounts of materials may be 
in the process lines inside the MBA.  Additionally, some “hold up” may occur where 
materials are permanently deposited in the process lines.  During an inspection, it may 
be necessary for the facility operator to clear the process lines in order for the inspector 
to perform the material balance.  For the occasions where there is more than a significant 
quantity of material in the hold up, the inspector will directly measure the material 
deposited in the process lines in the process area.  A material balance period is 
established for each MBA and/or facility based on the uncertainties inherent in the 
safeguards measurement techniques as well as the timeliness criteria. 
 
The nuclear material measured at KMPs can either be in bulk form or item form.  
Materials in item form are items that are easy to identify and account for.  Examples of 
item form material includes fuel assemblies and fuel pins.  Bulk material is liquids, gas 
or powder.  Bulk material also includes pellets or pebbles that cannot be individually 
identified for NMA (International Atomic Energy Agency 2001). 
 
Another verification method is Containment and Surveillance (C/S).  This method 
utilizes the continuous monitoring or “continuity of knowledge” (CoK) of items or 
materials to verify their presence.  Specifically, surveillance cameras are used to monitor 
the presence of material until it can be placed in an IAEA sealed container.  IAEA seals 
can be generally understood as a tamper indicating locks.  The C/S method is usually 
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applied to safeguarded materials which are difficult to verify by quantitative 
measurements, such as irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies.   
 
Attended, Unattended, and Remote Monitoring Systems (AMS/UMS/RMS) are 
deployed at facilities to assist the inspectors carrying out their mission.  AMS are either 
portable or resident at a facility and require an IAEA inspector to operate them.  These 
are devices such as handheld radiation detectors and physical seals.  UMS are resident at 
a facility and do not require an inspector to operate them.  These include devices such as 
detectors, cameras, and electronic seals in process and transport areas.  Data are 
collected by these systems continuously.  Conditions regarding the inspector’s 
authorities to review, collect, and remove data from a facility depend upon individual 
agreements between the IAEA and the facility established through the Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement (International Atomic Energy Agency 1972) and the Model 
Additional Protocol (International Atomic Energy Agency 1997).  Data restricted to the 
facility must be evaluated during an inspection by an inspector at the facility and either 
erased after use or left behind at the facility.  Data released from the facility may be 
retrieved physically by an inspector via a data storage device.  RMS are UMS using a 
remote monitor (RM) which can collect data remotely via the internet and are used to 
reduce the burden of inspection for both the IAEA inspector and the facility operator. 
2.1.3 UNATTENDED AND REMOTE MONITORING SYSTEMS 
UMS generally consist of a detector, detector electronics, data acquisition system, data 
storage system, and backup power supply.  RMS includes all these with the addition of a 
remote monitor (RM) such as a modem or other connectivity devices.  Redundancies of 
components are required to ensure that there are no system failures or loss of data.  
Individual component failures occur and must be anticipated in the system design stages.  
For UMS/RMS systems which focus on maintaining the CoK, a system failure may 
result in the loss of the CoK, if there is data loss.  If loss of the CoK occurs, inspectors 
must perform a PIV to be performed to regain the CoK.  A UMS/RMS failure also 
triggers an unscheduled maintenance where a technician is dispatched immediately to 
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replace/repair the failed system.  Both the PIV and maintenance are manpower intensive 
and consume significant IAEA and operator resources.  Thus, UMS/RMS reliability is 
very important to the optimization of safeguards. 
2.1.4 CURIUM-PLUTONIUM RATIO (Cm-Pu Ratio) 
The Cm-Pu ratio technique is where the Cm-Pu ratio is multiplied by either the singles 
or doubles neutron count rate to obtain the concentration of plutonium in the measured 
material.  The neutrons from 
244
Cm are a dominant source of neutrons in spent fuel and 
fresh fuel that still contains major actinides.  Once the 
244
Cm is measured by neutron 
detectors the concentration of plutonium in the spent fuel or fresh fuel can be calculated 
based on the ratio (Rinard et al. 1996).  The fresh fuel from the ESFR pyroprocessing 
facility leaves the actinides, including 
244
Cm, in the fuel.    
2.2 RELIABILITY ENGINEERING 
The proliferation weaknesses of a system with respect to UMS reliability can be 
determined by identifying the least reliable component or subsystem in the system. 
 
Reliability engineering is the analysis of the reliability and failure characteristics of 
individual components or a system of components.  Reliability is defined to be “the 
probability of a product performing its intended function for a stated period of time 
under certain specified conditions” (Mitra 1998).  The reliability of a component can be 
modeled statistically using time-independent or time-dependent failure probability 
distributions and measurable parameters, such as the component mean-time-to-failure 
(MTTF).  Time-independent models, such as the exponential distribution, are used to 
model random chance-failures with a constant, time-independent failure-rate.  Time-
dependent models, such as the Weibull distribution, are used to model random chance-
failures with a variable, time-dependent failure-rate (Mitra 1998).  Time-dependent 
models are particularly useful for modeling the debugging or wear-out of components 
while the time-independent models are useful for modeling normal operation.  System 
reliability can be calculated from the reliability models for each of the individual system 
 10
components.  These reliability engineering models must be applied to a problem to 
produce results. For this work, the ESFR has been adopted as the model to demonstrate 
these methods. 
2.3 EXAMPLE SODIUM FAST REACTOR (ESFR) 
The Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR) is a hypothetical Generation IV (GenIV) 
nuclear reactor; it is not an operating facility and will presumably never be built.  This 
hypothetical sodium-cooled fast reactor and pyroprocessing facility were designed by 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) for the purpose of facilitating discussion on the 
subject of fast reactor and pyroprocessing safeguards in the absence of a safeguards 
confidential design and processing information from an operating facility.   
 
Sodium fast reactors are one of the GenIV facilities that would possibly have a co-
located nuclear fuel reprocessing facility included in the design.  Nuclear material 
pyroprocessing is a type of dry reprocessing that uses molten salts as solvents as 
opposed to aqueous reprocessing e.g. PUREX process (Plutonium 
and Uranium Recovery by Extraction) that uses water and organic compounds.  The 
ESFR pyroprocessing facility never separates the plutonium from the actinides; therefore 
the fresh fuel contains actinides.  Nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities are of particular 
concern when it comes to proliferation resistance.  Having the co-located facility 
increases the attractiveness of the site to potential proliferators due to the presence of 
bulk nuclear material and the ability to acquire plutonium in a form easier to convert to a 
weapon. 
 
The ESFR design includes four 800 MWth (300 MWe) reactors (Argonne National 
Laboratory 2006) and an on-site pyroprocessing fuel cycle facility (FCF), which 
includes fuel fabrication, as shown in Fig. 1 (Argonne National Laboratory 2006).  The 
fuel used at the ESFR is metallic fuel containing U and Pu.  
 
 11
 
Figure 1. Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR) layout 
  
The pyroprocessing facility layout is shown in Fig. 2 (Argonne National Laboratory 
2006).  The basic, high-level materials flow for the pyroprocessing facility is described 
below.  More information on the pyroprocessing facility and the material flow can be 
found in Appendix A.  The material in the pyroprocessing facility is processed in batches 
and does not flow through pipes. 
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Figure 2. ESFR pyroprocessing facility layout 
 
The below process areas are seen in Fig. 2. 
• Assembly Disassembling (AD) 
The irradiated fuel assemblies are received from the fuel storage pit and disassembled. 
The fuel pins are passed into the argon filled process cell to be chopped.  Assembly 
hardware that does not contain nuclear material is disposed.  On average 0.57 fuel 
assemblies are processed per day over the entire year.  The nuclear fuel being 
processed is from the co-located fast reactor which uses metallic fuel.  Additionally, 
the fuel has been cooled for 7-8 years before it is sent to the pyroprocessing facility. 
 
• Element Chopper (EC) 
The element chopper converts the irradiated fuel pins into ¼-inch long pieces.  One 
hundred and fifty four pins are chopped each day.  The chopped fuel pins are moved to 
the electro-Refiner (ER) in an anode basket.  Four anode baskets are sent to the ER per 
day.  Each anode basket contains about 10 kg of Pu within the irradiated fuel pieces. 
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• Electro-Refiner (ER) 
The purpose of the ER unit is to electrochemically separate uranium from other spent 
fuel constituents. During normal ER operation, essentially all of the uranium dissolves 
in the medium and electrochemically transports and deposits on the cathode as 
uranium metal. The uranium metal on the cathode is transferred to the uranium product 
processing (UP) unit.  Undissolved cladding pieces, known as hulls, and noble metal 
fission products remain in the anode basket and are transferred to metal waste 
processing (MW).  During normal ER operation, effectively all of the plutonium and 
other transuranic (TRU) elements dissolve in the salt phase. The salt from the ER 
containing dissolved U, TRU and fission products (FP) is sent to U/TRU 
Extraction/Recovery (TR).   
 
Two cathodes containing uranium metal are sent to uranium product processing (UP) 
per day.  One container per day of salt is sent to the U/TRU Extraction/Recovery (TR).  
 
• Uranium Product Processing (UP) 
The cathode from the ER is sent to the UP.  The uranium metal from the ER is cast 
into ingots.  The ingots are sent to the product prep injection caster furnace (IC).  One 
container every three days is sent to the IC with twenty four 3.7 kg uranium (and small 
amounts of TRU) ingots.  The adhering salt is recycled back to the ER. 
 
• U/TRU Extraction/Recovery (TR) and U/TRU Product Processing (TP) – Two-Stage 
Electrolysis Option 
One container of salt per day from the ER is sent to the U/TRU Extraction/Recovery 
(TR).  Each container has 260 kg of salt.  The salt from the ER contains dissolved 
TRU (about 10.4 kg of Pu per container), reactive fission products, small amounts of 
cladding and small amounts of uranium.  The U/TRU is removed from the salt in a 
two-stage process by electrochemical reduction.  During the first stage, 100% of the U 
and 86% of the TRU is assumed to be removed.  During the second stage, 86% of the 
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TRU is again extracted from what is left.  This results in approximately 98% TRU 
extraction from the salt via the two electrolysis stages.  
 
In the U/TRU product processing the U/TRU metal is formed into ingots.  The ingots 
are sent to the product prep injection caster furnace (IC).  
 
• Product Prep Injection Caster (IC) 
In the product prep unit, metal ingots from UP and TRU/U product processing are 
melted above 1200 ºC to serve as feed for fuel fabrication.  Metal ingots are melted, 
mixed, and cast into TRU/U metal slugs.  
 
• Pin Fabrication/Pin Processing (PP) 
TRU/U metal slugs from the IC are sent to the pin fabrication/pin processing (PP).  
The slugs are put into metal cladding with bond sodium to fill the gap between the 
TRU/U and the cladding.  Each fuel pin is sealed, tested for leaks and sent to assembly 
fabrication (AF). 
 
• Assembly Fabrication (AF) 
The 154 fuel pins per day from PP are sent to the assembly fabrication (AF).  In the 
air-filled shipping and receiving cell, the pins are assembled into fuel assemblies.  On 
average 4 assemblies per week are assembled. 
2.4 PREVIOUS WORK 
2.4.1 APPROACHES TO PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE 
Success Tree Model Approach 
Golay (2001) used the success tree representation as the framework to assess 
proliferation success probability.
 
 By determining an overall proliferation success 
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probability for an assessed facility design, comparisons between facility design concepts 
could be made. 
  
Sentell (2002) did a study following the work of Golay that tested the concepts presented 
in Golay's study.  Sentell used the same success tree model that was developed by Golay 
to compare a typical UO2 fuelled pressurized water reactor (PWR), a PWR with 
thorium-oxide fuel, and a pebble bed modular reactor (PBMR).  The probabilities used 
by Sentell for his success tree were based on his expert judgment. 
Integrated Methodology for Quantitative Assessment of Proliferation Resistance of 
Advanced Nuclear Systems Using Probabilistic Methods 
This study used a probabilistic approach with event-trees and fault-trees to model 
diversion from the spent fuel storage of a modular pebble bed reactor system (MPBR).  
An integrated evaluation methodology was used.  The methodology includes 
proliferation competition model development, model input evaluation, and pathway 
assessment.  Expert elicitation was used for evaluation of key model inputs.  The results 
of the study demonstrate the probabilistic approach to assessing the proliferation 
resistance of an advanced nuclear energy system (Ham 2005). 
Safeguards Logic-Trees 
Cojazzi, Renda and Contini (2004) elaborated on the safeguards logic-trees developed 
by Hill (1998).   This investigation demonstrated the application of the fault-tree 
technique to the assessment of the proliferation resistance.  The study identified possible 
acquisition pathways in a given nuclear fuel cycle and their quantification in terms of 
non-detection probability. 
Multi-Attribute Utility (MAU) Analysis 
MAU analysis has been used since the late 1970's to rank the attractiveness and risk 
factors associated with different proliferation pathways.  In 2000, Ko, Kim, Yang and 
Park used MAU theory and an electrical circuit representation to model proliferation 
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resistance in a quantifiable way (Ko et al. 2000).  In 2007, Charlton and his colleagues 
developed an additive, multi-attribute utility analysis (MAUA) method for proliferation 
resistance assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Advanced Fuel Cycle 
Initiative (AFCI) program (Charlton et al. 2007). 
 
MAU analysis is applicable to a wide variety of nuclear energy systems and can identify 
strengths and weaknesses in a system.  MAU analysis uses attributes (e.g., weight 
fraction of Pu in target material) that are weighted by importance to determine a 
proliferation resistance measure for each step.  Each attribute is assigned a utility 
function via expert knowledge or a physical characteristic of the attribute.  MAU allows 
ranking of various options and non-technical components can be considered.  The values 
given to the attributes and weighting factors use objective (measurable) and/or subjective 
types of determinations. 
A Practical Tool to Assess the Proliferation Resistance of Nuclear Systems: the SAPRA 
Methodology 
A “simplified approach for proliferation resistance assessment” (SAPRA) was 
developed by AREVA for analysis of proliferation resistance of their reactor designs.  It 
is based on an evaluation of the efficiency of material-related, technical, or institutional 
barriers against diversion or misuse by a country possessing civilian nuclear material or 
having developed technologies on its own territory or abroad.  It was not a sophisticated 
method but rather a crude quantitative attempt to index or “measure” the proliferation 
resistance of a civilian nuclear fuel cycle at each of its steps (Greneche 2008). 
2.4.2 PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE APPROACHES APPLIED TO THE ESFR 
PR&PP Evaluation: ESFR Full System Case Study Final Report 
This study applies the proliferation resistance and physical protection (PR&PP) 
methodology to the ESFR pyroprocessing fuel cycle facility (Generation IV 
International Forum Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation 
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Methodology Working Group 2009).  Targets, target material, and potential proliferation 
pathways of the material in the pyroprocessing facility are outlined for the ESFR.  
Proliferation pathways for each material balance area (MBA) were analyzed 
qualitatively based on technical difficulty, cost, time, detection probability, fissile 
material type, and detection resource efficiency. The analysis focused on diversion (vs. 
misuse and abrogation/break-out).  This study was an overview of the pathway as a 
whole.  Further study would open up the possibility of analyzing the specific pathway 
segments (or steps the proliferators would take).  Expert elicitation was used for the 
qualitative analysis in this case study. 
Application of the Event-Tree/Fault-Tree Modeling Approach to the Evaluation of 
Proliferation Resistance 
This study by Coles and Zentner (2007) used the PR&PP methodology to perform a 
fault-tree analysis of an attempted diversion scenario from the pyroprocessing facility at 
the ESFR.  This diversion would result in the diversion of one significant quantity (SQ) 
of material in one year.  The study focused on pathway analysis of a protracted diversion 
from the external uranium container. 
Markov Model Approach to Proliferation-Resistance Assessment of Nuclear Energy 
Systems 
Scientists at Brookhaven National Laboratory used a Markov model approach to assess 
the proliferation resistance of the ESFR for a protracted diversion (Yue et al. 2008).  
Their quantitative assessment modeled uncertainty, false alarms, concealment, and 
human performance.  The PR&PP methodology also was incorporated into the model 
framework. 
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CHAPTER III 
RELIABILITY DESIGN PROCESS 
 
For existing safeguards systems, the proposed method can be used to determine the 
reliability (or probability of failure) of installed systems.  For future systems, it would be 
used to design a safeguards system to a specified reliability. 
 
System reliability is related to the probability of system failure.  An analyst/designer can 
integrate this failure probability into more comprehensive probabilistic PR&PP models.  
Both the analysis and design processes are proposed in this chapter and demonstrated in 
the next chapter. 
3.1 ANALYSIS AND DESIGN PROCESS – OVERVIEW 
Fig. 3 shows the reliability design process.  First, the reliability criteria for a system or 
facility are chosen and the initial safeguards design is laid out.  The safeguards design 
reliability is analyzed to determine if it meets the reliability criteria.  If it does the 
safeguards can be finalized and installed; otherwise, the safeguards design is revised and 
redundancies are added. 
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Figure 3. Design process for safeguards systems with respect to reliability criteria 
 
3.2 RELIABILITY CRITERIA 
The reliability criteria are user defined.  The goal is to have the highest reasonable 
reliability criteria for a system.   
 
Unattended systems which maintain the continuity-of-knowledge (CoK) require a high-
level of reliability as system failure would result in the loss of the CoK.  The cost 
associated with regaining the continuity-of-knowledge (if it is possible at all) is 
generally very high. 
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3.3 SAFEGUARDS DESIGN 
The safeguards design consists of an overarching conceptual design of how the 
safeguards system will work at a given facility.  The safeguards approach is generalized 
by facility type but varies significantly from facility to facility.  A detailed discussion of 
safeguards system design is outside the scope of the current research.   
3.4 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The reliability analysis focuses on determining the reliability of a safeguards system 
design.  From the system analyst’s and designer’s prospective - there are two methods to 
acquiring appropriate reliability model parameters: 
 
(1)  Estimate system reliability from the data generated by past experience. 
(2)  Estimate system reliability from the individual component reliabilities stated by the 
manufacturer. 
 
For method (1), the IAEA would be able to collect data on component failures and 
replacements over time.  Proper failure reporting and archiving generates the reliability 
data necessary to determine the best model (either exponential or Weibull) and to 
estimate model parameters.  For method (2), as previously discussed, system reliabilities 
can be estimated from individual component reliabilities. 
 
Most products go through three distinct phases from product inception to wear-out.  Fig. 
4 shows a typical life-cycle curve for which the failure rate (λ) is plotted as a function of 
time (Mitra 1998).  This curve consists of the debugging phase, chance-failure phase, 
and wear-out phases.    The debugging phase represents the initial problems identified 
and corrected during prototyping and exhibits a decrease in the failure rate.  The chance-
failure phase represents the useful life of the product and exhibits failures which occur 
randomly and independently.  The wear out phase represents the end of the product’s 
useful life as parts age, wear out and exhibit an increase in the failure rate. 
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Figure 4. General equipment failure rate over the equipment lifetime 
 
Some basic concepts in reliability engineering are the mean time to failure (MTTF), the 
mean time to detection (MTTD), the mean time to repair (MTTR), and the mean time 
between failures (MTBF).  The MTTF is the average (or expected) time interval between 
when a product is initially functional until it fails.  The MTTD is the average (or 
expected) time interval between when a product failure occurs and is detected.  The 
MTTR is the average (or expected) time interval between when a product failure is 
detected until it is repaired.  The MTBF is the average (or expected) time between 
failures.  The relationship between the these concepts is 
 
 .MTBF MTTF MTTD MTTR= + +       (3.1) 
 
If time to detection is instantaneous or minimal (e.g., through remote monitoring) then 
MTBF is 
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0.MTBF MTTF MTTR where MTTD= + ≈      (3.2) 
 
If the time to detection is minimal and time to repair is short or minimal compared to the 
time to failure, then: 
 
      where .MTBF MTTF MTTD MMTR MTTF≈ + ≪     (3.3) 
 
3.4.1 MODELING COMPONENT RELIABILITY 
A component’s reliability is represented by a distribution.  Described below are two 
common distributions used to model reliability. 
Exponential Distribution 
For components with a failure rate that is constant and independent of time, failures are 
exponentially distributed.  As seen in Fig. 4, the exponential distribution would be 
applied to the chance-failure phase of the component’s lifetime.  For example, if you had 
some number of identical components, N, and each began operating at time t = 0, and 
each component is expected to fail to fail randomly over time,  the probability that a 
component will fail by time t will be exponentially distributed as shown in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5. Failure function F(t) or CDF for the exponential distribution, 0.2λ =  
 
For the chance-failure phase of a component’s life (Fig. 4), the time until failure of a 
component with a constant failure rate can be modeled by the exponential distribution.  
These are in contrast to the debugging and wear out phases of a component discussed in 
the next sublevel.  These phases have decreasing and increasing failure rates, 
respectively, which may be modeled by the Weibull family of distributions (Mitra 1998). 
 
For exponentially distributed failures, the probability that a component fails at or before 
time, t, given a constant failure rate, λ, is represented by F(t), the failure function or the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the exponential distribution: 
 
 '
0
( ) ' 1 ,   0.
t
t tF t e dt e tλ λλ − −= = − ≥∫       (3.4) 
   
( ) 1 tF t e λ−= −
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The failure function F(t) is related to the probability density function (PDF), f(t):   
 
( )
( ) ,   0.
dF t
f t t
dt
= ≥         (3.5) 
 
For the exponential distribution, the PDF is: 
 
 ( ) ,  0.tf t e tλλ −= ≥         (3.6) 
 
The MTTF for the exponential distribution is constant and is the reciprocal of the failure 
function and equal to the expected value E(T):  
 
0 0
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) .E T F t dt R t dt MTTF
∞ ∞
= − = =∫ ∫      (3.7) 
 
For repairable equipment where the failure detection and component repair times are 
short relative to the MTTF, the MTTF is also equal to the mean time between failures 
(MTBF). 
 
The probability that failure does not occur at or before time t  is represented by ( )R t , the 
reliability function, and is the compliment of the CDF: 
 
( ) 1 ( ).R t F t= −         (3.8) 
 
For the exponential distribution, the reliability function is: 
 
 ( ) tR t e λ−=          (3.9) 
 
and is shown in Fig. 6. 
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Figure 6. Reliability function R(t) for the exponential distribution, 0.2λ =  
 
In general, the failure-rate function, r(t), is given by the ratio of the PDF, f(t), to the 
reliability function, R(t); 
 
( )
( ) .
( )
f t
r t
R t
=          (3.10) 
 
For the exponential failure distribution: 
 
 ( ) ,
t
t
e
r t
e
λ
λ
λ
λ
−
−= =         (3.11) 
 
which implies a constant failure rate, which is consistent with the earlier statement. 
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Weibull Distribution 
For components with a variable failure rate, i.e., time-dependent, failures can often be 
modeled by the Weibull distribution.  This is a three-parameter distribution whose PDF, 
f(t), is given by: 
 
 
1 ( )
( )
( ) ,   
t
t
f t e t
ββ γ
αβ γ γ
α α
− − −  − = × × ≥  
    (3.12) 
 
and the CDF or failure function, F(t), is:  
 
 
( )
( ) 1 ,   .
t
F t e t
βγ
α γ
− −  = − ≥       (3.13) 
 
The parameters are a location parameter ( )γ γ−∞ < < ∞ , a scale parameter ( 0)α α > , and 
a shape parameter ( 0)β β > , however, the γ  parameter always equals zero when applied 
to reliability modeling (Mitra 1998).  The location parameter determines the location or 
shift of the distribution.  The scale parameter determines the spread of the distribution.  
The shape parameter affects the shape of the distribution (e.g. normal distribution, 
exponential distribution, etc).  The PDFs for 0γ = , 1α =  and several values of 
( 0.5,1, 2, 4)β β =  are shown in Fig. 7 (Mitra 1998).   
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Figure 7. Weibull probability density functions (PDF) for 0γ = , 1α = , 0.5,1,2,4β =  
 
The reliability function, R(t), for the Weibull distribution is given by: 
 
( )
( )
t
R t e
β
α−=         (3.14) 
 
and the MTTF is: 
 
 
1
,
1
MTTF α
β
 
= ×Γ + 
       (3.15) 
 
where Γ  is the gamma function which is expressed by 
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 1
0
( ) .x tt e x dx
∞
− −Γ = ×∫         (3.16) 
 
The failure-rate function, r(t), for the Weibull time-to-failure probability distribution is  
 
 
1( )
( ) .
( )
f t t
r t
R t
β
β
β
α
−
= =         (3.17) 
 
Fig. 8 shows the shape of the failure rate function for the Weibull distribution, for values 
( 0.5,1,3.5)β β = and 1α = . 
 
 
Figure 8. Failure-rate functions r(t) for the Weibull distribution for 0γ = , 1α = and 0.5,1,3.5β =  
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For 0γ = , 1α = , 1β = , the failure rate is constant with time and the Weibull distribution 
becomes the exponential distribution (Fig. 8).  If 0γ = , 1α = and 0.5β = , the failure 
rate decreases with time and can be used to model components in the debugging phase 
(Fig. 8).  And if 0γ = , 1α = and 3.5β = , the failure rate increases with time and can be 
used to model components in the wear-out phase.  In this case, the Weibull function 
approximates the normal distribution (Fig. 8). 
3.4.2 MODELING SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
Most systems are made up of a number of components.  The reliability of each 
component and the configuration of the components which make up the system 
determine the system reliability.  To increase the reliability of a system, redundancies 
can be added by placing components in parallel.  As long as one of the parallel 
components operates, the system operates.  Described here are the methods to determine 
a system’s reliability based on the reliability of the individual system components for 
systems with components configured in series, parallel, and a combination of the two.  In 
Chapter IV these will be used to calculate the system reliability of unattended 
monitoring systems which consist of a detector, data collect computer, and modem in 
series with redundancies in parallel.  The exponential distribution will be used to model 
the components. 
Systems with Components in Series   
Fig. 9 shows a system with three components (A, B, and C) in series. 
 
 
 30
 
Figure 9. System with components A, B and C in series 
 
For the system to operate, each component must operate.  If one component fails, the 
entire system will fail.  It is assumed that the components operate independently of each 
other (that is, the failure of one component has no influence on the failure of any other 
component).  In general, if there are n components in series, where the reliability of the 
ith  component is denoted by iR , the system reliability, SR  is 
 
1 2 ... .S nR R R R= × × ×         (3.18) 
 
For the components in Fig. 9 the system reliability is 
 
S A B CR R R R= × ×         (3.19) 
 
where RA, RB, RC are the reliability of components A, B, and C, respectively. 
 
The system reliability decreases as the number of components in series increases.  
Although over-design in each component improves reliability, its impact would be offset 
by the number of components in series.  Manufacturing capabilities and resource 
limitations restrict the maximum reliability of any given component.  Product redesign 
that reduces the number of components is a viable alternative. 
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If the system components can all be assumed to have a time-to-failure given by the 
exponential distribution, i.e., each component has a constant failure rate; we can 
compute the system reliability, failure rate, and mean time to failure.  As noted earlier, 
when the components are in the chance-failure phase, the assumption of a constant 
failure rate could be justified. Suppose the system has n components in series, each with 
an exponentially distributed time-to-failure with failure rates 1 2, ,..., nλ λ λ .  The system 
reliability, RS, is found as the product of the component reliabilities: 
 
 
11 2 ... .
n
i
in
t
tt t
SR e e e e
λ
λλ λ =
 
−  −− −  
∑
= × × × =      (3.20) 
 
This implies that the time-to-failure of the system is exponentially distributed with an 
equivalent failure rate, Sλ , of  
 
 
1
.
n
S i
i
λ λ
=
=∑          (3.21) 
 
Therefore, if each component that fails is replaced immediately with another that has the 
same failure rate, the mean-time-to-failure for the system, MTTFS, is given by 
 
 
 
1
1 1
.S n
S
i
i
MTTF
λ λ
=
= =
∑
        (3.22) 
 
Systems with Components in Parallel 
System reliability can be improved by placing components in parallel.  Since 
components are redundant and independent of each other; the system operates as long as 
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at least one of the components operates.  The only time the system fails is when all the 
parallel components fail.  Fig. 10 shows an example for a system with three components 
(A, B, and C) in parallel.  All components are assumed to operate simultaneously.   
 
 
Figure 10. System with components A, B and C in parallel 
 
Suppose we have n components in parallel, with the reliability of the ith  component 
denoted by ,  1, 2,...,iR i n= .  Assuming that the components operate randomly and 
independently of each other, the probability of failure of each component is given 
by 1i iF R= − .  Now, the system fails only if all the components fail.  Thus, the 
probability of system failure, FS, is  
 
1 2
1
(1 ) (1 ) ... (1 ) (1 ).
n
S n i
i
F R R R R
=
= − × − × × − = −∏     (3.23) 
 
For the components in Fig. 10 the system failure, FS, is 
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(1 ) (1 ) (1 )S A B CF R R R= − × − × −       (3.24) 
 
where RA, RB, RC is the reliability of component A, B, and C, respectively. 
 
The reliability of the system, RS, is the complement of FS and is given by 
 
 
1
(1 ) 1 (1 ).
n
S S i
i
R F R
=
= − = − −∏        (3.25) 
 
If the time-to-failure of each component can be modeled by the exponential distribution, 
each with a constant failure rate ,  1, 2,...,i i nλ = , the system reliability (RS), assuming 
independence of component operation, is given by 
 
 
1 1
1 (1 ) 1 (1 ).i
n n
t
S i
i i
R R e
λ−
= =
= − − = − −∏ ∏       (3.26) 
 
The time-to-failure distribution of the system is not exponentially distributed.  Therefore, 
the mean time to failure (MTTF) for the system with n identical components in parallel, 
assuming that each component is immediately replaced by an identical component, is 
given by 
 
 1 1 1 1(1 ... ).
2 3
MTTF
nλ= + + + +       (3.27) 
 
Systems with Components in Series and in Parallel 
Complex systems often consist of components that are both in series and in parallel.  
Reliability calculations are based on the previously discussed concepts, assuming that 
components operate independently. For the complex system shown in Fig. 11 
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Figure 11. Complex system with components in series and in parallel 
 
 
1S A B CR R R R= × ×         (3.28) 
 
where  
 
1 2 3 4
1 2 3
1 (1 )(1 ) and
(1 )(1 )(1 ).
A A A A A
B B B B
R R R R R
R R R R
= − − × − ×
= − − −
     (3.29) 
 
RA is the reliability of components A1, A2, A3, and A4.  The same applies for RB.  RA1 is 
the reliability of component A1, etc.  If the time to failure for each component can be 
assumed to be exponentially distributed, the system reliability and mean time to failure 
can be calculated under certain conditions using the previously discussed procedures. 
 
Systems with Standby Components 
In a standby configuration, one or more parallel components wait to take over operation 
upon failure of the currently operating component.  Here, it is assumed that only one 
component in the parallel configuration is operating at any given time.  Because of this 
the system reliability is higher than for comparable systems with components in parallel.  
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In parallel systems discussed previously, all components are assumed to operate 
simultaneously.  Fig. 12 shows a standby system with a basic component and two 
standby components in parallel.  Typically a failure-sensing mechanism triggers the 
operation of a standby component when the currently operating component fails. 
 
 
Figure 12. System with one main component and two standby components 
 
If the time to failure of the components is assumed to be exponential with failure rate λ , 
the number of failures in a certain time t adheres to a Poisson distribution with the 
parameter tλ .  Using the Poisson distribution, the probability of x failures, P(x), in time 
t is given by 
 
 
( )
( ) .
!
t xe t
P x
x
λ λ− ×
=         (3.30) 
 
For a system that has a basic component in parallel with one standby component, the 
system will be operational at time t, as long as there is no more than one failure.  In this 
situation the system reliability, R(t), is 
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 ( ) .t tR t e e tλ λ λ− −= + ×         (3.31) 
 
For a system that has a basic component and two standby components (Fig. 12) the 
system will be operational if the number of failures is less than or equal to 2.  The 
system reliability is  
 
 
2( )
( ) .
2!
t t t tR t e e t eλ λ λ
λ
λ− − −= + × + ×       (3.32) 
 
In general, if there are n components on standby along with the basic component (for a 
total of n+1 components in the system), the system reliability is given by 
 
 
2 3( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1 ... .
2! 3! !
n
t
s
t t t
R t e t
n
λ λ λ λλ−
 
= + + + + + 
 
    (3.33) 
 
The mean time to failure for such a system is  
 
 
( 1)
.s
i
n
MTTF
λ
+
=         (3.34) 
 
3.4.3 SIMULATION 
Direct calculations can be performed to determine the reliability of simple systems.  
However, simulations are better suited for the analysis of complex systems with various 
component models and/or complex distributions.  Simulations are relatively simple to 
understand and easy to implement.  A random number generator is used to simulate 
random failures given a representative failure distribution for each component.  First, a 
random number, T, is generated uniformly between 0 and 1.  Second, the reliability 
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function is set equal to T.  Third, the equation is inverted for the time, ft , which 
represents the time of the random failure. 
 
 1( ) ( ).f fR t T t R T
−= ≥ =        (3.35) 
 
For the exponential distribution, 
 
( ) f
t
R t T e
λ−= =         (3.36) 
 
where 
 
ln( )
,f
T
t
λ
−
=          (3.37) 
 
which is shown in Fig. 13. 
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Figure 13. Simulation example for failure function exponential distribution 
 
For the Weibull distribution, 
 
( ) , and
ft
R t T e
β
α
 
−  
 = =        (3.38) 
 
1
ln( ) .t T
f
βα= − ×         (3.39) 
 
The repair distribution is coupled to the failure distribution to complete the simulation 
model.  The simulation should be run a sufficient number of times to reduce the variance 
of the MTTF of the system.  Alternatively, the model can be run for the lifetime of the 
facility to include scheduled maintenance, upgrades, etc. 
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3.5 RELIABILITY DESIGN 
A system designer iteratively improves the reliability of the components most likely to 
fail the fastest in the system one at a time while minimizing costs.  After the addition of 
each component, the designer should repeat the reliability analysis of the updated design 
and compare the updated MTTF for the system with the value stated in the reliability 
criteria.  If the updated MTTF is greater than the specified reliability criteria, the design 
has acceptable reliability.  If the MTTF is less than the specified value, additional 
redundancies or more reliability components are necessary in the design and the design 
process is iterated again. 
 
The approach to adding redundancies varies depending on additional design constraints, 
such as cost.  For example, on each iteration of the design process a component is added.  
Without consideration of the cost of the added component, the designer would simply 
add a redundancy with the goal of minimizing components.  Therefore, the design is 
optimized to maximize the improvement-per-component-added.  However, if cost is 
considered, the designer would add a redundancy in the most cost efficient manner.  
Thus, the design is optimized to maximize the improvement-per-cost-added. 
 
In Fig. 14, a designer with the choice of system A, B or C would choose system B 
because it meets the minimum reliability criteria and does not exceed the maximum cost 
for the system.  
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Figure 14. Reliability vs. cost 
 
3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methods and distributions used to analyze the reliability of 
systems and design systems with target reliabilities.   The modeling of components in 
series, parallel and in complex systems was additionally reviewed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 OBJECTIVE 
Chapter IV demonstrates the safeguards reliability decision process using the ESFR 
pyroprocessing facility.  Basic unattended monitoring components with associated 
failure rates will be applied to the ESFR fuel cycle facility (FCF) and analyzed for 
overall reliability. 
4.2 SAFEGUARDS DESIGN FOR ESFR PYROPROCESSING FACILITY 
A hypothetical and basic safeguards system design for an ESFR pyroprocessing facility 
is presented here.  The “hypothetical” refers to the fact that an actual facility of this type 
does not exist, thus the custom attended and unattended monitoring systems which 
would be used by the IAEA to safeguard this facility also do not exist.  The “basic” 
refers to the fact that the presented design only considers the basic UMS component of 
the safeguards system design and therefore does not include the detail of a complete 
safeguards design for this facility.  A complete safeguards design would include 
directional monitoring of the fuel, in-process monitoring of the pyroprocessing, 
containment and surveillance, and in-core operational monitoring. 
 
Many of the UMS systems proposed in the literature for use at the ESFR FCF suggest 
using technology that is either not available or not approved for use by the IAEA.  Since 
the purpose of this design is to facilitate the demonstration of the reliability analysis, the 
design presented here only includes currently available technology in use by the IAEA; 
the design itself is not emphasized. 
 
The UMS used in the current design are discussed in terms of the UMS technologies 
used to measure the particular nuclear material form because, as mentioned previously, 
the exact UMS equipment would be of a custom design using technology available to the 
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IAEA.  The UMS technology used at each measurement point is described in the design 
and not a specific system.  The appropriate reliability models and parameters associated 
with each UMS technology is estimated from information available in the literature for 
similar UMS equipment or a reasonable parameter is approximated.  Clearly, it is not 
appropriate to publish actual IAEA UMS reliability values for confidentiality reasons 
and, consequently, the values used here are not meant to imply accuracy but to be 
reasonable estimates.  Again, the objective is demonstration of the reliability analysis 
process. 
4.2.1 MATERIAL BALANCE AREAS AND PORTALS 
Nuclear material accountancy (NMA) is performed by applying material balance areas 
(MBA) to the fuel cycle facility (FCF) of the ESFR and monitoring the flow of materials 
in and out of the MBAs.  These MBAs are shown in Fig. 15.  MBAs are based on the 
convenience of the measurement of the nuclear material at the entrances and exits of 
these areas.   The primary movement of materials is through Portal 1, to Portal 2, to 
Portal 7, and through Portal 8 last.  At these locations the materials are in the form of 
spent fuel assemblies, spent fuel elements, fresh U/TRU elements, and fresh U/TRU fuel 
assemblies, respectively. Potentially there are additional convenient measurement points 
inside the process area, such as the U/TRU ingots, but without specific details, such as 
ingot size and shape, no meaningful assumptions about measurements will be made in 
this exercise. 
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Figure 15. MBAs, for ESFR pyroprocessing facility 
 
MBA 1 contains the assembly disassembly (AD) area.  Spent fuel assemblies pass 
through Portal 1 from the spent fuel storage to AD.  Spent fuel pins exit the AD through 
Portal 2 to the element chopper (EC). Portal 9 is used to move fuel handling equipment 
between MBA 1 and MBA 3. 
 
MBA 2 includes the element chopper, electro-refiner (ER), uranium product processing 
(UP), U/TRU extraction/recovery (TR), U/TRU product processing (UP), injection 
caster furnace (IC), pin processing (PP), oxidant production (OP) and metal waste 
processing (MW).   MBA 2 is also referred to as the process cell (PC) and is a hot cell 
and filled with argon. 
 
MBA 3 contains only the assembly fabrication.  Fresh fuel pins enter the MBA through 
portal 7 and fresh fuel assemblies exit MBA 3 through portal 8.  
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MBA 4 contains the ceramic waste processing (CW) and waste form temporary storage 
(WS).  Salt waste enters MBA 4 through Portal 3.  The vitrified waste canisters exit the 
CW through Portal 4 into the WS.  Portal 5 is used when the vitrified waste will be 
removed from the site. 
 
Portal 1.  The spent fuel assemblies are passed through multiple, ring-type neutron 
counters upon entering MBA1.  The measured total neutron and gamma counts should 
be consistent with Monte Carlo n-Particle (MCNP) and burn-up calculations which 
utilize operator declarations and in-core monitoring, if any. 
 
Portal 2.  Spent fuel pins pass through Portal 2 from the assembly disassembly (AD) area 
to the element chopper (EC). 
 
Portal 3.  Spent salt passes through Portal 3 from the process cell to MBA 4.  This portal 
will not be considered in the safeguards design due to its infrequent use. 
 
Portal 4.  Vitrified waste canisters pass through Portal 4 from ceramic waste processing 
(CW). This portal will not be considered in the safeguards design due to its infrequent 
use. 
 
Portal 5.  Vitrified waste canisters pass through Portal 5 from the waste form temporary 
storage.   
 
Portal 6.  Make-up TRU and uranium pass through Portal 6 from an external source.  
 
Portal 7.  Fresh fuel pins pass through Portal 7 from pin processing (PP) in the process 
cell to assembly fabrication (AF). 
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Portal 8.  Fresh fuel assemblies pass through Portal 8 from assembly fabrication (AF) to 
fresh fuel storage. 
 
Portal 9.  Fuel handling equipment passes through Portal 9 back and forth between 
assembly disassembly and assembly fabrication. 
4.2.2 SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS FOR ANALYSIS 
To facilitate the analysis of the ESFR FCF, some simplifying assumptions were made.  
 
● MBA 4, Portal 4 and Portal 5 were not considered in this analysis since the waste 
portion of the facility would be in use much less often than MBA 1, MBA 2 and 
MBA 3.  MBA 4 is where waste is processed and it is assumed it will only 
operate once a large quantity of waste has accumulated to be vitrified. 
● Portal 3 was not considered in the analysis.  It is assumed Portal 3 is under IAEA 
safeguards seal and not used unless an inspector is present with attended 
monitoring.  This is because the waste transferred through Portal 3 is assumed to 
be infrequent. 
● Portal 6 was not considered in the analysis.  Portal 6 is under IAEA safeguards 
seal and is not used unless an inspector is present with attended monitoring.  This 
portal is to add makeup material to the fuel as needed and the portal will not need 
to be used frequently. 
● Portal 9 was not considered in the analysis as a simplifying assumption and 
because nuclear material does not pass through this portal. 
● Transfer hatches 1 and 2 were not considered in the analysis.  They are used to 
move equipment into a hot area for repair and will be assumed to also be used 
infrequently and under IAEA safeguards seal. 
 
After the above assumptions are applied, only MBA 1, MBA2, MBA 3, Portal 1, Portal 
2, Portal 7 and Portal 8 in will be considered for analysis (see Fig. 16). 
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Figure 16. Simplified MBAs and portals for ESFR pyroprocessing facility 
 
4.2.3 UNATTENDED MONITORING SYSTEM TECHNOLOGIES 
The following assumptions were made for unattended monitoring systems: 
 
1. No dual-use equipment where the facility and the IAEA share equipment. 
2. Integrated safeguards, where the equipment and data collected are both utilized by the 
IAEA and the operator, was not considered. 
3. Only technologies currently in use by the IAEA or similar was considered. 
4. Only the key equipment needed for the Cm-Pu balance was considered.  Peripherals 
such as directional flow monitoring were not considered in this analysis. 
5. No components will be modeled as stand-by components.  The IAEA currently does 
not implement stand-by for UMS. 
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At each portal there are certain data to be collected.  Below in Table 2 are the basic 
systems that would be needed to implement Cm-Pu accountancy.  This is based on the 
ESFR safeguards in Option 1 of Budlong Sylvester et al. (2003). 
 
Table 2. Safeguards equipment for ESFR simplified design layout 
Measurement 
Point 
Nuclear 
Material Form 
Measurement 
Technique 
Measurement Technology 
Portal 1 Spent Fuel 
Assembly 
Gamma + Neutron 
Gross Counts → 
Burnup → Cm → Pu 
1 Fission Chambers 
1 Ionization Chambers 
Portal 2 Spent Fuel 
Element 
Gross Neutron →   Cm 
→ Pu 
He-3 Collar, Passive 
Portal 7 Fresh U/TRU 
Fuel Element 
Gross Neutron →   Cm 
→ Pu 
He-3 Collar, Passive 
Portal 8 Fresh U/TRU 
Fuel Assembly 
Gross Neutron →   Cm 
→ Pu 
He-3 Collar, Passive 
 
At Portal 1 the burnup (BU) of the spent fuel assembly is determined.  One fission 
chamber and the one ionization chamber are used to count total neutrons and total 
gammas. These measurements are used to confirm the declared burnup of the spent fuel 
assembly.  At Portal 2 the neutron activity is measured to determine the 
244
Cm in the 
spent fuel pin which is used to determine the concentration of plutonium using the Cm-
Pu ratio.  Similarly at Portals 7 and 8 the 
244
Cm is being counted using a He-3 Collar.  
The recycled fuel exiting Portals 7 and 8 still has 
244
Cm and long-lived actinides in the 
fuel. 
4.3 RELIABILITY CRITERIA 
Safeguards components have a goal of being designed with a minimum MTBF of 150 
months (Doyle 2008).  Assuming MTTR is very small compared to MTTF and MTTD is 
instant, a MTBF of 150 months can be assumed to be equal to a MTTF of 150 months.  
When a MTTF for a component is not available a 150 month MTTF will be assumed.  
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For the overall system, a goal of 2 years or 24 months MTTF will be the user defined 
reliability criteria.  The overall system consists of Portal 1, Portal 2, Portal 7, and Portal 
8 as depicted in Fig. 16. 
4.4 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
The overall system reliability is modeled by assuming the probabilistic reliability of each 
system is independent of the probabilistic reliability of every other system, as if the 
subsystems for Portals 1, 2, 7, and 8 are in series.  If any one subsystem fails, then the 
whole system fails.  This is calculated using Eq. 4.1 where RT(t) is the reliability for all 
portal subsystems, R1(t) is the reliability for Portal 1 subsystem, R2(t) is the reliability for 
Portal 2 subsystem, R7(t) is the reliability for Portal 7 subsystem, and R8(t) is the 
reliability for Portal 8 subsystem.  The reliability of the system is 
 
1 2 7 8( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).TR t R t R t R t R t= × × ×       (4.1) 
 
The individual subsystems are first modeled with the minimum equipment needed and 
without redundancies in equipment.  The MTTF for each component and each “link” in 
the chain are analyzed to identify the weakest points in the “chain”.  To demonstrate the 
design process, the reliability is improved by adding redundancies until the overall 
system reliability meets the specified reliability criteria. 
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Figure 17. Overall system -- portal subsystems in series 
 
Fig. 17 represents the overall safeguards system considered in this analysis.  The remote 
monitor (RM) is pictured for completeness but is not considered a critical component 
and therefore is not included in the reliability analysis of each subsystem.  The data 
acquisition (DAQ) component would continue to receive and store information even if 
the RM was inoperable.   
4.4.1 PORTAL 1 SUBSYSTEM 
To calculate and confirm the reported burnup, total neutrons and total gammas are 
counted for the spent fuel assemblies entering Portal 1.  A minimum subsystem for 
Portal 1 consists of one fission chamber, one ionization chamber and one DAQ unit in 
series. 
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Figure 18. Portal 1 subsystem -- no redundancies 
 
Fig. 18 does not represent the physical arrangement of the detectors; rather it illustrates 
that the failure of one detector or DAQ unit would constitute a failure or loss of 
knowledge for the subsystem.  The MTTF for a fission chamber is 2556.75 days or 84 
months, which equates to a FCλ  of 0.000391122 chance of failure per day.  This number 
is based on a 7 year lifetime of fission chambers as reported by PHOTONIS (2007).  The 
MTTF of an ionization chamber is 2435 days or 80 months, which also equates to a ICλ  
of 0.000410678 chance of failure per day based on a 15% failure rate per year reported 
in (Emel’yanov et al. 1977).  The MTTF for a DAQ unit is reasonably estimated to be 
4565.625 days or 150 months as discussed in 4.3.  The DAQλ  for a 150-month MTTF of 
the DAQ unit is 0.000219028 chance of failure per day.  Eq. 4.2 is used to calculate the 
reliability of the Portal 1 subsystem, R(t)Portal1: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ** *
1
;DAQFC IC
tt t
Portal FC IC DAQ
R t R t R t R t e e e
λλ λ −− −= × × = × ×   (4.2) 
       
( )1 1
0
 .Portal PortalMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.3) 
    
R(t)FC is the reliability of the fission chamber, the R(t)IC is the reliability of the ionization 
chamber and the R(t)DAQ is the reliability of the DAQ unit.  The MTTF for Portal 1 
subsystem is 979.60 days or 32.18 months and is calculated by Eq. 4.3.   
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4.4.2 PORTAL 2, PORTAL 7, PORTAL 8 SUBSYSTEMS 
Portals 2, 7, and 8 subsystems all use the same technology; a neutron detector using He-
3 tubes and a DAQ unit.  The He-3 collar and DAQ unit are set up in series as shown in 
Fig. 19.  An He-3 collar has one complete ring of He-3 tubes and is represented by the 
“He-3 Collar” box in Fig. 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. Portal 2 subsystem -- no redundancies 
 
Eq. 4.4 shows the R(t)Portal2 for the Portal 2 subsystem and also is equivalent to the Portal 
7 and 8 subsystems.  In future equations results for Portal 2 subsystem will only be 
calculated but are equivalent to the results for Portal 7 and Portal 8.  The MTTF for a 
He-3 collar is assumed to be 150 months, which equates to a 3Heλ  of 0.000219028 
chance of failure per day.   The MTTF for a DAQ unit is estimated to be 150 months or 
4565.625 days.  The DAQλ  for a 150-month MTTF of the DAQ unit is 0.000219028 
chance of failure per day.  The reliability of Portal 2 is:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3 **
 2 3
  ,DAQHe
tt
Portal He DAQ
R t R t R t e e
λλ −−= × = ×     (4.4)
    
and 
 
( )2 2
0
 .Portal PortalMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.5) 
 
R(t)He3 is the reliability of the He-3 collar.  The MTTF for Portal 2 (also Portal 7 and 
Portal 8) subsystems is 2282.81 days or 75 months and is calculated using Eq. 4.5.    
 52
4.4.3 SUMMARY OF INITIAL ANALYSIS 
Each subsystem must function for the entire system to function; thus, the reliability of 
the entire system is modeled as the probability of occurrence of four independent events 
in series. 
 
The entire system (Fig. 20) reliability, RT(t), can be calculated as 
 
1 2 7 8( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).TR t R t R t R t R t= × × ×              (4.6)
  
As before, the reliability of the system is determined by 
 
( )
0
 .system systemMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.7) 
 
 
Figure 20. Entire system in series 
          
For the values previously presented, the overall MTTF for all the entire system is 428.27 
days or 14.07 months.  This combines Portal 1, 2, 7 and 8 in series as seen in Fig. 17 and 
Fig. 20. The overall MTTF does not meet the goal of 24 months for the entire system. 
Following the process outlined in Sublevel 3.1, redundancies must be added to meet the 
reliability criteria.  
 
 
Portal 1 
 
Portal 8 
 
Portal 7 
 
Portal 2 
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4.5 RELIABILITY DESIGN – EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCIES 
To meet the overall reliability criteria goal of 24 months for the system, redundancies in 
equipment must be added.  In the absence of cost information, redundancies are added so 
that the number of overall components in a system is minimized, as opposed to the 
highest improvement-per-cost added.  This cycle is iterated until the desired system 
reliability is met.   
4.5.1 PORTAL 1 SUBSYSTEM 
The Portal 1 subsystem consists of four redundant subsystems (Fig. 21).   
 
 
Figure 21. Portal 1 with four redundant subsystems in parallel 
 
Eqs. 4.8 and 4.9 are used to calculate the reliability of the four subsystems in parallel:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
 1 1 2 3 4
 1- 1 1  1  1  ,
Portal Set Set Set Set
R t R t R t R t R t       = − × − × − × −         (4.8) 
 
and 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 4* * * *( ) 1 1 1 1 1 .Set Set Set Sett t t tR t e e e eλ λ λ λ− − − −= − − × − × − × −   (4.9) 
            
The reliability of Set 1, R(t)Set1, is equal to the reliability of the Portal 1 subsystem 
calculated in Sublevel 4.4.1.  R(t)Set1 and  R(t)Set2 ,R(t)Set3 and R(t)Set4 are identical and the 
reliability calculated in Sublevel 4.4.1 can be used for all subsystem sets: 
 
( )1 1
0
 .Portal PortalMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.10) 
    
The MTTF for Portal 1 subsystem is 2040.83 days or 67.05 months and is calculated 
using Eq. 4.10.  The MTTF of Portal 1 with four redundant subsystems is about double 
the previous MTTF of 32.18 months. 
4.5.2 PORTAL 2, PORTAL 7, PORTAL 8 SUBSYSTEMS 
Portal 2, 7, and 8 subsystems consist of two redundant subsystems.  Portal 2 is pictured 
in Fig. 22.  
   
 
Figure 22. Portal 2 with two redundant subsystems in parallel 
  
Eq. 4.11 and 4.12 are used to calculate the reliability of two subsystems in parallel for 
Portal 2, R(t)Portal2:   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
 2 1 2
 1- 1 1  ;
Portal Set Set
R t R t R t   = − × −        (4.11) 
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( ) ( ) ( )1 2* *2  1 1 1 ;Set Sett tPortalR t e eλ λ− −= − − × −      (4.12) 
 
( )2 2
0
 .Portal PortalMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.13) 
 
The MTTF for Portal 2, 7 and 8 subsystems is 3424.22 days or 112.5 months and is 
calculated using Eq. 4.13. The MTTF of Portal 2, 7 and 8 with two redundant subsystems 
is 1.5 times the previous MTTF of 75 months. 
4.5.3 SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS WITH EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCIES 
Again, each subsystem must function for the entire system to function; thus, the 
reliability of the entire system is modeled as the probability of occurrence of four 
independent events in series:  
 
1 2 7 8( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).TR t R t R t R t R t= × × ×       (4.14)
   
As before, the reliability of the system is determined by: 
 
( )
0
 .system systemMTTF R t dt
∞
= ∫        (4.15) 
         
For the values previously presented, the overall MTTF for the entire system is 732.01 
days or 24.05 months.  This combines Portals 1, 2, 7 and 8 in series as originally seen in 
Fig. 17. The MTTF of 24.05 months meets the design goal of 24 months MTTF for the 
entire system. 
4.6 EVALUATION 
Table 3 summarizes the calculation results for the designs with and without 
redundancies. 
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Table 3. Results summary 
Subsystem Component Group 
MTTF without 
Redundancies 
(months) 
MTTF with 
Redundancies 
(months) 
Portal 1 Fission Chamber 84 84 
 Ionization Chamber 80 80 
 DAQ 150 150 
 Overall 32.18 67.05 
Portal 2/7/8 He3 Detector 150 150 
 DAQ 150 150 
 Overall 75 112.5 
Overall System  14.07 months 24.05 months 
 
From Table 3, it is clear that Portal 1 represents the least reliable link in the system and 
hence, in the proliferation resistance model, a weakness.  By adding a redundancy of 
four subsystems to Portal 1, this subsystem is made more reliable by a factor of 
approximately 2.   By adding a redundancy of two subsystems to Portal 2, 7 and 8, each 
portal is made more reliable by a factor of 1.5.  The entire system is made more reliable 
by a factor of 1.7.  After adding sufficient redundancies, the design criteria of 24 months 
MTTF was met and the design accepted. 
 
Obviously cost, space and other constraints limit the number of redundancies which can 
be installed; hence, an actual system would be designed to achieve the desired system 
reliability at the minimum cost.  Instead, the approach used here, in the absence of cost 
information, was simply to minimize the number of components.  This is only one 
safeguards design that meets the reliability criteria but was the design that had the fewest 
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components and met the reliability criteria.  Appendix B shows other possible 
combinations of redundancies for the overall system. 
4.7 DISCUSSION  
This reliability process only considers reliability and not other considerations such as 
cost.  It is clear that the system has doubled the number of components and therefore 
doubles the cost of the components but did not double the reliability.  This is a 
consideration safeguards designers will need to make as they design a system. 
 
Also, designs that focus safeguards on main material entrances and exits could be part of 
the design criteria.  For the ESFR, a designer could add more redundancies to Portal 1 
and Portal 8.  While every portal presents an opportunity for proliferation, it is up to the 
safeguards designer to decide if one portal would require more redundancy than another.  
 
During analysis it may be determined that component cost becomes a dominating factor.  
Additionally, it may be discovered that spending more money for a more reliable part (or 
cost-benefit) would reduce the number of redundancies needed in a system. 
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4.8 SUMMARY 
The UMS for the ESFR FCF was initially designed with no redundancies.  Upon 
performing the reliability analysis of that design, it was identified that the reliability 
criteria were not met.  The design process used here was to iteratively add a redundancy 
to minimize components but reach the reliability criteria and then repeat the analysis to 
identify the new MTTF for the system.  Eventually, when the desired MTTF was met by 
the design, the iteration was stopped and the design accepted.  This approach does not 
consider the cost of components.  Alternatively, a system designer with cost information 
may choose to add redundancies based on an improvement-per-unit-cost basis as 
opposed to simply the improvement-per-component basis used here. 
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CHAPTER V 
USE OF THE RELIABILITY PROCESS IN PROLIFERATION 
RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT 
 
Proliferation resistance studies as discussed in Sublevel 2.4 can be qualitative and/or 
quantitative.  Many proliferation resistance studies and methods rely on expert judgment.  
The proliferation resistance assessments that use fault-tree, logic-tree or success-tree 
analysis (e.g. Golay 2001; Cojazzi et al. 2004; Coles and Zentner 2007) attempt to move 
away from qualitative analysis and toward quantitative analysis.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, the reliability process yields a quantitative result in the 
form of a MTTF for the system.  In the fault-tree modeling the different proliferation 
pathways for specific diversions are modeled (Coles and Zentner 2007).  One of the 
basic events in fault-tree models for proliferation pathways is the chance that the IAEA 
safeguards (e.g. detectors) are not operating and have failed due to random chance 
during the nuclear material diversion.  This reliability process provides a way for 
analysts to find a quantitative answer to this basic event.  The reliability process also 
offers a way to do a time-dependent fault-tree analysis. 
 
The reliability process was demonstrated on the ESFR for detectors and DAQ units.  
This process could additionally be applied to containment and surveillance (C/S).  For 
various proliferation pathways the chance that different IAEA safeguards are not 
operating need to be known for the analysis.   The quantitative result from the reliability 
process would be an improvement versus an expert judgment derived number. 
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Many proliferation resistance studies look at a Nation or State covertly diverting 
material from an IAEA safeguarded facility.  Another consideration is for a State to 
prevent other States or individuals from diverting or stealing nuclear material from their 
facility.  To detect and deter this, States use their own detectors, surveillance and 
physical protection of the facility.  The reliability process demonstrated in this research 
can be applied to the equipment and sensors used for the physical protection of a facility.  
This equipment is important to a facility and analyzing its reliability would help a 
nuclear facility improve its protection. 
 
Overall there are many areas the reliability process demonstrated in this research can be 
applied to proliferation resistance studies.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
A reliability engineering approach to probabilistic safeguards system analysis and design 
can be used to reach meaningful conclusions regarding the proliferation resistance of a 
UMS.  The methods developed in this research provide analysts and designers alike a 
process to follow to evaluate the reliability of a UMS. 
 
A UMS was created for the ESFR FCF to facilitate demonstration of the new approach.  
The UMS emphasized the technologies and generalized hardware expected to be present 
at key measurement points but exact hardware specification was outside the scope of this 
study.   
 
The ESFR FCF UMS was analyzed to demonstrate the analysis and design processes 
that an analyst or designer would go through when evaluating/designing the proliferation 
resistance component of a safeguards system.  When comparing the MTTF for the 
system without redundancies, it is apparent that redundancies were necessary to achieve 
a design without routine failures. 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Quality engineering concepts and the approach developed here should be integrated into 
broader probabilistic proliferation resistance models for facilities utilizing UMS and 
RMS. 
 
Specific safeguards system reliability data are not and should not be published in the 
open literature but should be available to the IAEA for reliability analysis.  
Approximations or publicly available failure rates should be used in published research 
instead. 
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6.3 FUTURE WORK 
Extensions to this work could include additional detail in the reliability modeling, 
improvement on the safeguards design considered for the ESFR FCF, and the discussion 
of the method with respect to additional facilities to be built or already operating and 
using UMS. 
 
The IAEA and the international safeguards and non-proliferation (IS&NP) community 
could incorporate the reliability engineering approach to UMS design for upcoming fast 
reactor safeguards system designs.  The approach developed here suffices as a primer for 
an IAEA engineer designing UMS in general and for pyroprocessing. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
In Fig. 23 on the next page, is a detailed material flow sheet for the ESFR 
pyroprocessing facility.  In the figure HM refers to heavy metal and refers to U and TRU 
combined. 
 
 
6
6
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APPENDIX B 
 
The table below gives all possible combinations of redundancies for the overall system.  
Each portal has the minimum of one subsystem up to a maximum of four redundant 
subsystems.  P1 is Portal 1; P2 is Portal 2, etc.  Tot# is the total number of components 
for that particular system.  Highlighted in yellow are systems that meet the 24 month 
reliability criteria goal.  The system used in this research has a box around it signifying it 
has the least number of components while still meeting the reliability criteria goal. 
 
Table 4. Number of redundancies at each portal 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
1 1 1 1 9 14.07035176 
1 1 1 2 11 15.00893389 
1 1 1 3 13 15.38205427 
1 1 1 4 15 15.59135793 
1 1 2 1 11 15.00893389 
1 1 2 2 13 16.08168475 
1 1 2 3 15 16.51081065 
1 1 2 4 17 16.75220039 
1 1 3 1 13 15.38205427 
1 1 3 2 15 16.51081065 
1 1 3 3 17 16.96346613 
1 1 3 4 19 17.21837521 
1 1 4 1 15 15.59135793 
1 1 4 2 17 16.75220039 
1 1 4 3 19 17.21837521 
1 1 4 4 21 17.48106218 
1 2 1 1 11 15.00893389 
1 2 1 2 13 16.08168475 
1 2 1 3 15 16.51081065 
1 2 1 4 17 16.75220039 
1 2 2 1 13 16.08168475 
1 2 2 2 15 17.31958763 
1 2 2 3 17 17.81834544 
1 2 2 4 19 18.09980751 
1 2 3 1 15 16.51081065 
1 2 3 2 17 17.81834544 
1 2 3 3 19 18.34668079 
1 2 3 4 21 18.64522152 
1 2 4 1 17 16.75220039 
1 2 4 2 19 18.09980751 
1 2 4 3 21 18.64522152 
1 2 4 4 23 18.9536388 
1 3 1 1 13 15.38205427 
1 3 1 2 15 16.51081065 
1 3 1 3 17 16.96346613 
1 3 1 4 19 17.21837521 
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1 3 2 1 15 16.51081065 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
1 3 2 2 17 17.81834544 
1 3 2 3 19 18.34668079 
1 3 2 4 21 18.64522152 
1 3 3 1 17 16.96346613 
1 3 3 2 19 18.34668079 
1 3 3 3 21 18.9073051 
1 3 3 4 23 19.2245275 
1 3 4 1 19 17.21837521 
1 3 4 2 21 18.64522152 
1 3 4 3 23 19.2245275 
1 3 4 4 25 19.55257612 
1 4 1 1 15 15.59135793 
1 4 1 2 17 16.75220039 
1 4 1 3 19 17.21837521 
1 4 1 4 21 17.48106218 
1 4 2 1 17 16.75220039 
1 4 2 2 19 18.09980751 
1 4 2 3 21 18.64522152 
1 4 2 4 23 18.9536388 
1 4 3 1 19 17.21837521 
1 4 3 2 21 18.64522152 
1 4 3 3 23 19.2245275 
1 4 3 4 25 19.55257612 
1 4 4 1 21 17.48106218 
1 4 4 2 23 18.9536388 
1 4 4 3 25 19.55257612 
1 4 4 4 27 19.89201478 
2 1 1 1 12 16.47058824 
2 1 1 2 14 17.77150917 
2 1 1 3 16 18.2970297 
2 1 1 4 18 18.59394369 
2 1 2 1 14 17.77150917 
2 1 2 2 16 19.29555896 
2 1 2 3 18 19.91665469 
2 1 2 4 20 20.26896596 
2 1 3 1 16 18.2970297 
2 1 3 2 18 19.91665469 
2 1 3 3 20 20.57906459 
2 1 3 4 22 20.9554221 
2 1 4 1 18 18.59394369 
2 1 4 2 20 20.26896596 
2 1 4 3 22 20.9554221 
2 1 4 4 24 21.34580199 
2 2 1 1 14 17.77150917 
2 2 1 2 16 19.29555896 
2 2 1 3 18 19.91665469 
2 2 1 4 20 20.26896596 
2 2 2 1 16 19.29555896 
2 2 2 2 18 21.10552764 
2 2 2 3 20 21.85085921 
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2 2 2 4 22 22.27565236 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
2 2 3 1 18 19.91665469 
2 2 3 2 20 21.85085921 
2 2 3 3 22 22.65075993 
2 2 3 4 24 23.10754847 
2 2 4 1 20 20.26896596 
2 2 4 2 22 22.27565236 
2 2 4 3 24 23.10754847 
2 2 4 4 26 23.58313993 
2 3 1 1 16 18.2970297 
2 3 1 2 18 19.91665469 
2 3 1 3 20 20.57906459 
2 3 1 4 22 20.9554221 
2 3 2 1 18 19.91665469 
2 3 2 2 20 21.85085921 
2 3 2 3 22 22.65075993 
2 3 2 4 24 23.10754847 
2 3 3 1 20 20.57906459 
2 3 3 2 22 22.65075993 
2 3 3 3 24 23.51145038 
2 3 3 4 26 24.00399027 
2 3 4 1 22 20.9554221 
2 3 4 2 24 23.10754847 
2 3 4 3 26 24.00399027 
2 3 4 4 28 24.5176081 
2 4 1 1 18 18.59394369 
2 4 1 2 20 20.26896596 
2 4 1 3 22 20.9554221 
2 4 1 4 24 21.34580199 
2 4 2 1 20 20.26896596 
2 4 2 2 22 22.27565236 
2 4 2 3 24 23.10754847 
2 4 2 4 26 23.58313993 
2 4 3 1 22 20.9554221 
2 4 3 2 24 23.10754847 
2 4 3 3 26 24.00399027 
2 4 3 4 28 24.5176081 
2 4 4 1 24 21.34580199 
2 4 4 2 26 23.58313993 
2 4 4 3 28 24.5176081 
2 4 4 4 30 25.05368647 
3 1 1 1 15 17.55986317 
3 1 1 2 17 19.04631029 
3 1 1 3 19 19.65121225 
3 1 1 4 21 19.99411429 
3 1 2 1 17 19.04631029 
3 1 2 2 19 20.80768653 
3 1 2 3 21 21.53176946 
3 1 2 4 23 21.94412955 
3 1 3 1 19 19.65121225 
3 1 3 2 21 21.53176946 
3 1 3 3 23 22.30806374 
3 1 3 4 25 22.75099967 
3 1 4 1 21 19.99411429 
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3 1 4 2 23 21.94412955 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
3 1 4 3 25 22.75099967 
3 1 4 4 27 23.21188127 
3 2 1 1 17 19.04631029 
3 2 1 2 19 20.80768653 
3 2 1 3 21 21.53176946 
3 2 1 4 23 21.94412955 
3 2 2 1 19 20.80768653 
3 2 2 2 21 22.9280397 
3 2 2 3 23 23.81034187 
3 2 2 4 25 24.31561884 
3 2 3 1 21 21.53176946 
3 2 3 2 23 23.81034187 
3 2 3 3 25 24.76326604 
3 2 3 4 27 25.3102607 
3 2 4 1 23 21.94412955 
3 2 4 2 25 24.31561884 
3 2 4 3 27 25.3102607 
3 2 4 4 29 25.88196628 
3 3 1 1 19 19.65121225 
3 3 1 2 21 21.53176946 
3 3 1 3 23 22.30806374 
3 3 1 4 25 22.75099967 
3 3 2 1 21 21.53176946 
3 3 2 2 23 23.81034187 
3 3 2 3 25 24.76326604 
3 3 2 4 27 25.3102607 
3 3 3 1 23 22.30806374 
3 3 3 2 25 24.76326604 
3 3 3 3 27 25.79564489 
3 3 3 4 29 26.3897457 
3 3 4 1 25 22.75099967 
3 3 4 2 27 25.3102607 
3 3 4 3 29 26.3897457 
3 3 4 4 31 27.01185715 
3 4 1 1 21 19.99411429 
3 4 1 2 23 21.94412955 
3 4 1 3 25 22.75099967 
3 4 1 4 27 23.21188127 
3 4 2 1 23 21.94412955 
3 4 2 2 25 24.31561884 
3 4 2 3 27 25.3102607 
3 4 2 4 29 25.88196628 
3 4 3 1 25 22.75099967 
3 4 3 2 27 25.3102607 
3 4 3 3 29 26.3897457 
3 4 3 4 31 27.01185715 
3 4 4 1 27 23.21188127 
3 4 4 2 29 25.88196628 
3 4 4 3 31 27.01185715 
3 4 4 4 33 27.66400805 
4 1 1 1 18 18.21019771 
4 1 1 2 20 19.81381306 
4 1 1 3 22 20.46928721 
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4 1 1 4 24 20.84160381 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
4 1 2 1 20 19.81381306 
4 1 2 2 22 21.72713478 
4 1 2 3 24 22.51783881 
4 1 2 4 26 22.96922853 
4 1 3 1 22 20.46928721 
4 1 3 2 24 22.51783881 
4 1 3 3 26 23.36826771 
4 1 3 4 28 23.85476476 
4 1 4 1 24 20.84160381 
4 1 4 2 26 22.96922853 
4 1 4 3 28 23.85476476 
4 1 4 4 30 24.36194896 
4 2 1 1 20 19.81381306 
4 2 1 2 22 21.72713478 
4 2 1 3 24 22.51783881 
4 2 1 4 26 22.96922853 
4 2 2 1 22 21.72713478 
4 2 2 2 24 24.0494732 
4 2 2 3 26 25.02202516 
4 2 2 4 28 25.58063992 
4 2 3 1 24 22.51783881 
4 2 3 2 26 25.02202516 
4 2 3 3 28 26.07655142 
4 2 3 4 30 26.68381413 
4 2 4 1 26 22.96922853 
4 2 4 2 28 25.58063992 
4 2 4 3 30 26.68381413 
4 2 4 4 32 27.32003469 
4 3 1 1 22 20.46928721 
4 3 1 2 24 22.51783881 
4 3 1 3 26 23.36826771 
4 3 1 4 28 23.85476476 
4 3 2 1 24 22.51783881 
4 3 2 2 26 25.02202516 
4 3 2 3 28 26.07655142 
4 3 2 4 30 26.68381413 
4 3 3 1 26 23.36826771 
4 3 3 2 28 26.07655142 
4 3 3 3 30 27.22387215 
4 3 3 4 32 27.88642619 
4 3 4 1 28 23.85476476 
4 3 4 2 30 26.68381413 
4 3 4 3 32 27.88642619 
4 3 4 4 34 28.58203415 
4 4 1 1 24 20.84160381 
4 4 1 2 26 22.96922853 
4 4 1 3 28 23.85476476 
4 4 1 4 30 24.36194896 
4 4 2 1 26 22.96922853 
4 4 2 2 28 25.58063992 
4 4 2 3 30 26.68381413 
4 4 2 4 32 27.32003469 
4 4 3 1 28 23.85476476 
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4 4 3 2 30 26.68381413 
P1 P2 P3 P4 Tot# MTTF (months) 
4 4 3 3 32 27.88642619 
4 4 3 4 34 28.58203415 
4 4 4 1 30 24.36194896 
4 4 4 2 32 27.32003469 
4 4 4 3 34 28.58203415 
4 4 4 4 36 29.31323283 
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